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REVIEW ESSAY: SUNSTEIN, STATUTES, AND 
THE COMMON LAW - RECONCILING 
MARKETS, THE COMMUNAL IMPULSE, AND 
THE MAMMOTH STATE 
Peter L. Strauss* 
AFrER THE. RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE. By Cass Sunstein. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 284. $25. 
Professor Cass Sunstein's new book, After the Rights Revolution: 
Reconceiving the Regulatory State, builds upon, and in important ways 
seeks to integrate, much of Professor Sunstein's work over the past 
several years. He has been one of our most prolific and influential 
writers on issues of governmental structure, approaching the subject 
both from more or less conventional administrative law perspectives1 
and from the constitutional perspectives of separation of powers. 2 His 
work has dealt with a tension often addressed in the literature, that 
between the eighteenth-century Madisonian constitutional engine of 
limited, internally checked government and the realities of our sprawl-
ing contemporary structures. A particular contribution of Sunstein's 
has been to insist on bringing forward the Madisonian visions, on their 
accommodation, not their abandonment. This contribution entails 
rather vigorous disagreement with the economics-driven theorists of 
public choice, on the right, and those of deconstructionism, on the left. 
Sunstein wants to build a conceptual framework for contemporary 
government that embraces the Madisonian ideal of government struc-
tured to serve genuinely public ends in face of the risk of faction; that 
vision entails both reaching agreement on appropriate distinctions be-
tween public and private ends, and finding effective contemporary ex-
pression of such ideas as "checks and balances." 
The "rights revolution" that presents the challenge with which 
Sunstein is concerned begins with the changes conventionally 
grounded in the New Deal and culminates in the rights explosion of 
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1961, Harvard; LL.B. 1964. - Ed. 
Thanks to Cynthia Farina, Eben Moglen, Henry Monaghan, Richard Pierce, and Roy Schotland, 
who read earlier drafts, and to the Abraham N. Buchman Fund for Administrative Law. 
1. See, e.g., Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1432 
(1988); Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 
(1985). , 
2. See, e.g .. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421 (1987). 
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the 1960s and 1970s - an explosion of environmental as well as civil 
rights. The role of government has expanded: no longer merely the 
antagonist to the citizen, the source of legal constraint, it now protects 
and promises her benefits as well. Laissez faire and minimal govern-
ment have been replaced by welfare economics and pervasive govern-
ment; the implicit assumption that the common law provides a 
prepolitical baseline of individual relations has been replaced by a di.s-
position to regard all law, common and statutory, in terms of both the 
social ends it seeks and those it achieves. These recent developments 
could be perceived, at least by the already powerful, to have moved 
government even more profoundly into the lives of citizens, regulating 
not only activity in the economic marketplace but also what might 
seem to be more private preferences for such tastes as risk, beauty, 
recreation, and social milieu. 3 
Although Sunstein tells us that After the Rights Revolution is 
aimed at the influential attacks of the Reagan and Thatcher adminis-
trations on government regulation (p. 1), one might imagine a stimu-
lus rather closer at hand. His University of Chicago colleagues and 
the scholarship on which they base their approaches stalk the foot-
notes that describe the analyses to which this book is a response.4 
They are for a minimalist state, believing that government intervention 
must inevitably be inferior to market ordering supported by the com-
mon law; he supports a richer mix between government intervention 
and individual autonomy. Acknowledging that regulation often fails, 
Sunstein seeks to demonstrate that market ordering must often fail as 
well - that regulation is justified by ends a polity could properly seek 
and could not expect to occur without government intervention. In its 
sweep, this is an extraordinary, and I think correct, ambition. Few 
problems facing the scholar concerned with issues of government 
structure are more important or difficult than reconciling the size and 
ambition of contemporary government with the founders' insistence 
on balance and constraint, or finding a way past the grim political 
accounts of government offered by the right and the left to a statement 
that leaves room for genuinely public ends of action. 
The initial chapters of the book sketch the growth of American 
regulation and attempt to assess its recent performance. Drawing on 
broad and effective reading of recent economic literature, Sunstein 
3. Examples include laws requiring the provision ofseat belts (and, more recently, their use), 
controlling outdoor advertising on highways, preferring low-impact to mechanized incursions on 
public lands, and prohibiting racial and other discriminations in private behavior. It is exactly 
Sunstein's point that, for the powerful, law has always regulated these matters to their advantage; 
to take only the most obvious example, it would strike a black person as odd to claim that law 
first became involved with private discriminatory behavior in 1964. The advantaged, nonethe-
less, may not have noticed having their preferences regulated - shaped into some form they 
would not personally have chosen - until in the 1960s. 
4. E.g., Intro. nn.2, 4; ch. 2 nn.1, 41-43. 
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seeks to refute the general critique of the regulatory enterprise, and to 
establish its general success. He acknowledges that particular failures 
have occurred - often attributing them, rather as Stephen Breyer 
did, 5 to inappropriate matches between public ends and the means 
chosen to implement them. For Sunstein, however, these failures are 
not finally determined by the fact of faulty legislative consideration 
(or, perhaps, legislative action distorted by the partial successes of pri-
vate-interest-seeking factions). Postenactment interpretation can con-
tribute sjgnificantly to the success or failure of regulation by 
identifying the public ends of legislation and building upon them. 
Thus, Sunstein's eventual focus in this account (one imagines 
others will be forthcoming) is on the courts and the problem of statu-
tory interpretation. For the courts, the issue posed by the rights 
revolution may be described as finding ways past "norms that are a 
legacy of the common law or that misconceive the values, functions, 
and failures of the regulatory state" (p. 160). Sunstein's way is to sug-
gest a series of interrelated canons or interpretive principles for courts 
to apply; these, he asserts, will better secure legislation's public ends 
than does the common law canon. 6 
Consider as an example a state workers' compensation law that 
makes no provision in terms for the case in which an employer dis-
charges a worker in retaliation for the worker having filed a claim 
under the law. Workers who understand that they will lose their jobs 
should they file claims are less likely to do so. That gives rise to the 
question whether the statute should be understood as requiring protec-
tion against such discharges. The common law generally follows the 
rule that employment is "at will" and, absent an implication from the 
statutory scheme, would provide no relief. 
One could not argue ... that purely as a logical matter, a workers' com-
pensation statute resolves the ambiguity. But the "deals" approach 
[treating legislation as the outcome of private-interest-group negotiation, 
and consequently entitled to no generative force] depends on the view 
that legislative silence on freedom to discharge should be understood as a 
resolution of the question, when it might merely mean inadvertence, fail-
ure to focus on the issue, or a delegation to the courts. The "deals" 
approach also depends on reflexive incorporation of common law princi-
ples as the baseline against which to read statutory silence, when the 
relevant baseline is the question to be decided. Some value judgment, 
informing legislative silence, must be made either way. [p. 208] 
An interpretive strategy consistent with the public values that underlie 
such legislation, he argues, would understand that "[b ]ecause dis-
charge would interfere significantly with the program, the proper con-
5. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND !TS REFORM (1982). 
6. The bulk of this part of his analysis recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review. Sun-
stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. R.E.v. 405 (1989). 
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clusion is that employers cannot discharge employees for filing claims" 
(p. 208). 
This brief passage suggests the attractive strengths of Sunstein's 
elaborately argued and broadly read thesis. As in his other work, he 
offers theory in the context of institutions as they exist in fact. Here, 
he gives us a legislature that is, and only can be, imperfectly attentive 
or expressive. He also presents a careful and imaginative reading of 
the cases suggesting the common law baseline from which traditional 
courts proceed. In discussing statutory interpretation, as iQ his gen-
eral account of regulation and its critics, Sunstein identifies the impor-
tant voices, presents their positions with understanding and clarity, 
and crisply states his own view. The general thrust of his work, that 
courts interpreting statutes have an obligation to carry forward their 
public purposes in preference to the received traditions those statutes 
change, has a lineage extending back at least as far as Pound, 7 Stone, 8 
and other major figures of the Progressive era. They, too, faced the 
propositions that the common law was inherently wise, and that stat-
utes were to be treated with suspicion rather than as generative 
sources of policy judgment; and they generated forceful arguments 
why, in a democratic society, a more sympathetic approach was re-
quired.9 It is striking to find these arguments having to be repeated. 
The following pages principally address Professor Sunstein's basic 
argument for building on, rather than defending against, legislative 
judgments, and so virtually ignore the details of his proposals for stat-
utory interpretation.10 Part I outlines Sunstein's case for some regula-
tion - the necessary failures of market ordering and the consequent 
need for a mixed economy in which government regulation intervenes 
7. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). 
8. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1936). 
9. Stone and Pound might not, however, have viewed the worker's compensation example as 
an instance of statutory interpretation, as such. Desirable as interpretation generous to legislative 
purposes was to them, in their lexicon "interpretation" referred only to statutory text. Full 
reception of a statute into the body of the Jaw implied, also, that it was to be "reasoned from by 
analogy the same as any other rule of law" - preferably, Pound argued, "as a later and more 
direct expression of the general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same gen· 
era! subject." Pound, supra note 7, at 385. Sunstein's example is much more readily understood 
as reflecting such a common law use of statutes than as interpretation per sc. 
10. Two colleagues have trenchantly questioned the workability in practice of those propos-
als, criticisms with which I largely agree, in an article responding to Sunstein's Harvard Law 
Review analysis, supra note 6. Moglen & Pierce, Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (1990); Professor Sunstein's characteristically 
disarming response appears as Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247 (1990). 
The basic problem they identify with Sunstein's recommended new canons for interpretation, 
viewed simply as a collection of aids, is this: as subtle and deeply considered as they are, they 
entail a complexity and conceded indeterminacy that will present difficult challenges to all 
judges, and offer little impediment to the magistrate who is also a politician. It seems more 
appropriate to view them not as a new set of black-letter rules, in the style of the formalist 
approaches Sunstein essentially spurns, but as exemplars of a reasoning style that begins with the 
proposition that statutory law is entitled to sympathetic and thus progenitive implementation. 
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in important ways. Part II addresses Sunstein's decision to tie his 
analysis to the public law innovations of the New Deal, and suggests 
ways in which the analysis might be strengthened by attention to ear-
lier struggles and changes - changes in common law as well as statute 
law, in markets as well as legal response - brought about by the 
emergence of a complex, national economy. 
Sunstein's analysis substantially depends on the proposition that 
public purposes can reliably be distinguished from rent-seeking pur-
poses, and yet he seeks to avoid having to choose between two possible 
justifications for giving legislative actions generative force: that they 
may reflect genuinely collective action entitled to respect in a demo-
cratic order; or that they may, in particular cases, reflect the public 
good. Part III suggests ways in which the elision of these two bases 
for respect may prove problematic. Part IV takes up two problems 
not directly confronted in Sunstein's analysis, the enormous growth of 
contemporary government and the difficulties we face in theorizing 
about human behavior in ways that account for both our collective 
and our individualistic instincts, and seeks to illustrate these problems 
by recasting the questions of statutory interpretation in the context of 
historical development. Finally, Part V suggests that Sunstein has not 
been sufficiently attentive to problems generated by his describing as 
"rights" those claims for governmental action lacking the characteris-
tic Holmes once identified as central to the availability of due process 
protections - that the claimants would be "exceptionally affected, in 
each case upon individual grounds."11 The powerful can go to court 
as easily as to political institutions, and turning collective interests into 
"rights" suggests the creation of potentials for blocking governmental 
action that require careful consideration. 
I. 
At its most fundamental level, Sunstein's book presents an argu-
ment for the status quo, a mixed economy in which government regu-
lation influences markets in important ways. From one perspective it 
is rather surprising that Sunstein must defend the status quo against 
arguments that the nation as a whole might be better served by a re-
turn to the principles of laissez faire. One had thought that the strug-
gle between the minimalist governmental intervention suggested by 
the nineteenth-century common law and proactive government was 
the principal domestic political battle waged from the Civil War up to 
the 1930s, and that the issue was decided then. The need for regula-
tory intervention seems greater today, as fish disappear from our seas 
and streams, and ozone from the air; and as we become aware of the 
extent to which our past history of discrimination still orders our pres-
11. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). 
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ent lives. The notion appears risible that an invisible hand signifi-
cantly responsible for elements of these troubles will lead us to the best 
available remedy, if only we will leave it undisturbed. Yet from an-
other perspective, the return to influence of these ideas itself may sug-
gest something about human nature, about the nature of the debate, or 
about the character of the intellectual enterprise that would be worth 
attending to. 
Sunstein's analysis is grounded in appreciation of the mixed econ-
omy, our inheritance from the New Deal he celebrates. His funda-
mental premise is that we require both government and freedom; each 
has limits in its potential contribution to human good that makes too 
much of it undesirable. The critics with whom Sunstein is principally 
concerned are those of the right, whose use of economic and political 
science theories grounded in the premise that human beings invariably 
act out of rational self-interest produces a distorted view of human 
nature and a grim view of the possibilities of government. He under-
stands that he must also meet criticism from the left - in particular 
(for an enterprise centered on the problem of interpretation), its claims 
regarding the indeterminacy of language and the irreducibly political 
dimensions of law. It is unlikely, however, that the left will see such 
questions as "Why Regulation?" (ch. 1) as serious ones, and the exam-
ples he repeatedly employs to suggest positive answers to those ques-
tions - discrimination avoidance, environmental protection, 
promotion of worker safety - will find easy support among left schol-
ars. On the whole, collectivism is a left enterprise, and what Sunstein 
defends in the mixed economy is the collectivist part of the mix. 
Given the global retreat from collectivist enterprises over the past few 
years of political history, Sunstein seeks to remind us that the unregu-
lated market is equally unreliable as a source of justice and to defend 
the claim that, at least occasionally, government can significantly im-
prove upon the market's performance. 
In broad outline, the argument is as follows: Although the initial 
Constitution (notably the Bill of Rights, but also such structural ar-
rangements as the separation of powers) was centrally concerned with 
preventing collective interference with private ordering, government 
was also called upon to protect life, liberty, property, and contract 
from private aggression - a regulatory function initially carried out, 
on the whole, through the common law. As a legal system for achiev-
ing these ends, the common law of the nineteenth century embodied 
much of the structure of laissez-faire. That it succeeded in achieving 
its regulatory ends without requiring a visible governmental or bu-
reaucratic apparatus "gave the nation a definite albeit misleading sense 
of statelessness" (p. 18). Yet the common law is not the ordained 
means for protecting life, liberty, property, and contract from private 
aggression, and the legislature may select alternative means - and 
alternative premises about what constitutes aggression - for doing so. 
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"Seeing the common law status as prelegal and neutral, judges (and 
many others) did not recognize its principles as part of a regulatory 
system at all, but regarded them instead as the state of nature" (p. 19). 
Hence, the mistake of Lochner v. New York, 12 undone during the New 
Deal by "a number of Supreme Court decisions treating the common 
law as a controversial regulatory system and as subject to democratic 
change" (p. 20). The Constitution, after all, did not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer's Social Statics.13 
This "democratic change" has produced an explosion of new 
"rights," some of which are easier to understand as communal than as 
strictly personal in character: rights to protection from discrimina-
tion, to clean air and water, to safety at work, in our cars, or at home, 
to medical care, to retirement income, and to welfare. The laws pro-
tecting these interests can be understood, at least in retrospect, as illus-
trating ways in which simple reliance on the operation of a market will 
not inevitably generate outcomes politically identified as contributing 
to the common good. Sunstein points out three broad ways in which 
market ordering is likely to fail and which legislative regulation might 
be able to correct: 
First, market mechanisms accept as given the existing distribution of re-
sources, and other factors "that are morally arbitrary .... There is no 
good reason for government to take these factors as natural or fixed, or 
to allow them to be turned into social and legal advantages, when it is 
deciding on the appropriate scope of regulation" (p. 39). "[T]he minimal 
sta~e, distributing basic entitlements, has a range of consequences for, 
indeed constitutes, the distribution of rights, wealth, and power . . . 
[which] in turn affects private preferences and beliefs. In this respect, it 
is not neutral ... " (p. 45). 
Second, market mechanisms cannot surmount - indeed, in an im-
portant sense they contribute to - collective action problems such as the 
prisoner's dilemma. This characteristic tends to favor smaller groups 
already commanding resources over the more numerous public. Politics 
and law provide means to overcome these problems. For example, 
although wage and hour legislation is commonly seen as an attempt to 
redistribute wealth between employer and employee, it might instead be 
understood as a means employees chose among themselves to deal with a 
collective action problem they otherwise face in seeking employment 
(without necessary regard for any effect on employers' wealth). Seen this 
way, wage and hour statutes "facilitate the satisfaction of private desires, 
and do not override them at all" (p. 45). 
Finally, markets do not self-correct for information failures or the 
effects of existing injustices that make apparent private preferences sus-
pect. One obvious setting for such failures is workplace safety, where 
market forces tend to penalize the spontaneous generation of informa-
tion revealing risk. Less obvious, perhaps, is the way in which market 
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
13. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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forces rely on preferences or tastes that may themselves be the product of 
contestable social or legal arrangements. A taste for discrimination, 
among whites, or an apparent willingness to accept subordinate posi-
tions, among minorities or women, may in significant respects be "a 
product of available opportunities, which are a function of legal rules ... 
allocat[ing] rights and entitlements" (p. 41). At its most simple, "when 
preferences are a function of legal rules, the rules cannot, without circu-
larity, be justified by reference to the preferences" (pp. 41-42). Law may 
be chosen to affect preferences, to remedy prior injustice, or, more sim-
ply, to express "collective aspirations or considered judgments" (p. 46). 
Indeed, as the relevant market will function on a different basis once 
information has been digested or law-influenced preferences changed -
once, for example, social expectations about smoking in public places 
have been altered - any concern that intervention with market forces 
will prove futile appears misplaced. "If the preference is itself a function 
of the legal rule, or of current consumption patterns, legal barriers will 
not be circumvented, for the preference in question will be diminished or 
eliminated" (p. 44). 
It does not follow that governmental interventions are invariably 
either sound or preferable to solutions relying on market ordering. 
Sunstein presents the case for a mixed economy not total control, and 
repeatedly emphasizes that government can fail, and that a system 
having freedom of contract, private property, and other provisions for 
reliance on voluntary arrangements "has the crucial advantage of re-
specting and fostering diverse conceptions of the good, an important 
part of individual freedom; it will promote economic productivity as 
well" (p. 46). Sunstein thus does not assert that government is not 
obliged to respect the integrity of existing distributions - that it 
could, for example, simply abolish private property. His is the more 
limited, and less controversial, claim that government need not respect 
the advantages that existing patterns of wealth create in various mar-
kets; it may, for example, regulate political campaign finances. If 
other values limit the extent of regulation (freedom of speech, for ex-
ample - a value not necessarily associated with the preservation of 
economic power), 14 the effect is only to underscore the ways in which 
the existing distribution of resources serves as a morally arbitrary ad-
vantage in the legal system. 
Sunstein's case for the status quo - against the minimalist state of 
laissez faire and for "a relatively large set of regulatory programs" (p. 
45) - is well put. Central to the analysis is a striking and important 
point, that today's legal order remains tied to the common law as the 
common law was before the emergence of the regulatory state, and in 
ways that cloak its political premises. Because the premises of that 
law conflict with the premises of a mixed economy to which both regu-
14. But cf. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 431. 
February 1991] Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common Law 915 
lation and markets are central, treating that body of law as the ground 
for legal reasoning tends to retard the effectiveness of current legisla-
tive enterprises. Understanding that common law grounded in laissez 
faire is not a neutral given, but rather the embodiment of a contestable 
set of economic-political premises, permits embracing the political ac-
complishments of the New Deal conceptions not as elaboration or em-
broidery upon those premises - something to be reconciled with them 
- but as displacing them. Once we have accepted this displacement, 
our intellectual task vis-a-vis the common law heritage becomes deter-
mining what to keep in a legal order centered elsewhere. Similarly, 
the intellectual task vis-a-vis regulation becomes understanding how 
we can ensure its success.15 It is, in other words, the common law that 
must be reconciled, and law school curricula or judicial analyses that 
keep it at the center practice Ptolemaic astronomy. 
II. 
Among the deeper structures of the book are a number of premises 
that, although not central to Sunstein's ultimate interpretive enter-
prise, merit examination. One is that "public law" and "private law" 
are separable categories, so that the developments Sunstein examines 
all concern "public law." A second is that the relevant events to 
which we need to adjust ourselves - the "rights revolution" - are 
events of law formation, the sudden outpouring of statutes establishing 
regulatory regimes that began shortly after the election of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt. A third (I am less sure whether this comes from 
Sunstein or whether I brought this to the reading) is that the common 
law in contemporary analyses, to which regulation is opposed, remains 
the constitutional founders' common law - a body of principles 
grounded in laissez faire and private ordering; correspondingly, the 
market remains the founders' market, one of individuals dealing capa-
bly face to face with their neighbors about goods generally within their 
ken. 
Suppose that we took seriously the proposition that law is not au-
tonomous - not in Posner's sense, that it lacks an intellectual center 
15. Professor Roy Schotland of Georgetown, responding to a draft of this essay, remarked 
that Lochner serves no Jess as a metaphor for a more complex reality than does the New Deal. 
Eighteenth-century common Jaw embraced a good deal of"regulation" (concerning, for example, 
inn keepers), as at least the Hamiltonians among the Constitution's drafters embraced regulation 
as well. Laissez faire notions find explicit mention in the analyses of Lord Abinger, Lemuel 
Shaw, and others reacting to the Industrial Revolution, and comp'ete against continuing recogni-
tion that regulation is well justified for businesses "affected with a public interest." Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). "Adam Smith wrote precisely because at that time, so much 
law was, for so long, so far from laissez faire. Sunstein seems to me (and by my lights, you fall 
into his vision on this) to have gotten unduly wrapped up in Lochner; in doing so he's made a 
significant contribution that I don't mean to deny or at all diminish. But he's overlooked or 
underplayed the' extent to which the Lochner vision is injuriously blind about earlier times and 
earlier Jaw." Letter of Dec. 10, 1990, on file with the author. 
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as compared to, say, economics, but in Holmes' terms, that it reflects 
not logic but experience. The proposition, then, is that law is not au-
tonomous of our culture; like our language and our political or eco-
nomic behavior, it is situated in and influenced by the world within 
which it exists, in ways that cannot be escaped. One can still believe 
that a subject exists, that law can be studied, illuminated, moved, in 
the same way that one can believe there is a subject of literary criti-
cism worth pursuing even after establishing that language is inevitably 
contextual and that it is no more possible for reader than writer to 
escape that context.16 The belief arises, at least in part, from our expe-
rience/faith that the obverse is also true, that the seething brew of 
behaviors in the culture we happen to share is also not autonomous, 
but the product of what has gone before, including its language, its 
laws, and so forth, and that the understandings we happen to reach 
about these matters will shape the experiences of the future. And it is 
at least in part true because of our experience/faith that doing the best 
we can to understand prior events, even if we can do no more than 
approximate, will bring us closer to a capacity to understand our pres-
ent or move the future. 
Were we to take such a course, then the important phenomenon to 
consider, in worrying about the New Public Law, would be less legal 
changes themselves - the New Deal effiorescence of regulatory stat-
utes that begins Sunstein's rights revolution - and more the cultural, 
social, political, and economic changes that set their context. This is 
hardly a new point; it was central to the work of Legal Realists, prom-
inently of Karl Llewellyn, whose chair Sunstein holds. Sixty years 
ago, describing changes in the law of sellers' obligations regarding 
quality, Llewellyn expressed the relation between experience and law 
in the following powerful terms: 
[In nineteenth-century common law,] [m]anufactured goods are handi-
craft articles, made by someone you know, and for the most local of 
markets. 
Out of this we move gradually into a credit and industrial econ-
omy .... Markets widen with improved transportation .... Sellers begin 
to build for good will, in wide markets . . . . The law of seller's obligation 
must change, to suit . 
. . . [W]ith the growing specialization of industry comes a complete 
dependence of the . . . consumer upon the wares put into a national 
market .... What is wanted is to protect the consumer dependent on a 
producer who is a stranger, or even anonymous. That needed protection 
is twofold: to shift the immediate incidence of the hazards of life in an 
industrial society ... to a group which can distribute the loss; and to 
place the loss where the most pressure will be exerted to keep down fu-
16. Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 91 YALE. 
L.J. 777 (1988). 
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ture losses. . . . Under such an ideal system of law the loss would lie 
ultimately where it belongs, on the consumers of the article concerned, 
en masse, in competition with other articles each carrying its own true 
costs in human life and effort. 17 
This passage brilliantly describes the change that occurred virtually 
without aid of statute in the common law of product liability, a change 
not fully realized until a few decades after Llewellyn wrote. 18 
Note that this common law is no longer the common law of laissez 
faire and personal markets; common law analysis has changed under 
the impulse of changing markets. It is not just that particular com-
mon law rules have changed in response to new market conditions; 
that this will occur - give or take a few decades of interim injustice -
is central to the argument of those who prefer it to other forms of 
government intervention. Rather, the change to note is the change in 
the basic terms of reference for the common law rules. From the as-
sumption that ordinarily the law will be doing justice between two 
individuals dealing "individually, in a face-to-face, closed, stable 
group"19 the law moved to considerations of loss distribution and so-
cial welfare, to placing loss "ultimately where it belongs, on the con-
sumers of the article concerned en masse. "20 The common law now is 
typically described as a regulatory system with distributional effects; 
presenting it as still generally premised in laissez faire is quaint at best. 
That today's common law, in some respects at least, appears to be 
making common cause with today's public (regulatory) law is hardly 
surprising, given the societal changes worked by the industrial revolu-
tion. The judges who shape it live in a world strikingly different from 
that of their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, and 
have been educated to the ways of this world, not their predecessors'. 
They live not only with mass distribution, mass advertising, faceless 
transactions, and numerous middlemen, but also with a much height-
ened experience of interdependence. Ours is a world of enhanced spe-
cialization and resulting mutual reliance, and one that understands 
that it is that way. That legislatures moved against diffuse forms of 
environmental harm sooner than did common law courts may be 
ascribable to the innate conservatism of courts, the retarding influence 
of precedent, the relative antiquity of judges' education, the passive 
and reactive characteristics of judicial action, or limitations on stand-
ing or remedy characteristic of judicial action. That legislatures 
moved at all, however, is best ascribed to our collectively enlarging 
perceptions of the impact of our behaviors on planet earth - percep-
17. K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 204, 341-42 (1930). 
18. See Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. R.Ev. 2301 
(1989). 
19. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 204. 
20. Id. at 342. 
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tions judges will eventually share, if they do not already share them, 
and that will move the common law in the same manner as changing 
markets moved the law of sales. So one may believe that we are not 
talking only about New Public Law but, more simply, about new law, 
and the means for its formation. 
If there is anything to this, if the more important phenomenon is 
, the changing ground rather than the changing law, then rather than 
look at the New Deal statutes and their progeny as such, we might 
better focus on the struggles that engendered them. Sunstein is not 
alone in treating the New Deal as a magic moment that gave rise to 
"the administrative state," and he gives a very persuasive account of 
the emergence of these laws as a response to a series of failures of 
market ordering under common law. (Markets, he argues, not only 
cannot be expected to respond to certain problems; they capture and 
tend to perpetuate preferences traceable to prior failures and injus-
tices.) Yet his focus on the rhetoric of the New Deal tends to deny the 
reader a sense of the continuity in the political struggles to which the 
New Deal was merely a culmination. 
Although the great eruption of American national government oc-
curred in the 1930s response to the Depression, the battle with the 
common law and laissez faire began in the states after the Civil War. 
It was during this time that our economy became national and indus-
trial, and the failures of laissez faire thinking and the common law to 
respond to those developments - notoriously, the carnage of the 
workplace, but also the changing character of manufacture and distri-
bution - became self-evident. Thus, for example, the development of 
workers' compensation statutes, already referred to; these statutes 
which may be seen either in traditional common law laissez faire 
terms, as an attempted redistribution of property from bakers to their 
employees, or in a wholly different light - as a response to problems 
of collective action occasioned by the changing character of the rele-
vant markets. Thus, the 1930s' reversal on substantive due process 
capped an argument about the proper role of government that had 
been ongoing for half a century; much of the federal legislation of the 
New Deal (unemployment insurance, for example) may be seen princi-
pally as a response to collective action problems among the states in 
achieving programs that had been on the political agenda for years.21 
Striking as it is that we seem to be reliving those battles today, Sun-
stein would be the more powerful if he acknowledged that, on the level 
of theory, he plays a role considerably older than that of FDR. He is 
playing Holmes22 to his Chicago colleagues' Peckham. 
21. Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
22. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1, 12 (1906). 
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III. 
Market ordering, Sunstein persuasively shows, not only cannot be 
expected to respond to certain problems; it captures and tends to per-
petuate the results of prior failures and injustice. Moreover, although 
Sunstein does not develop this point, the important characteristics of 
markets change over time, as the technologies of manufacture, trans-
portation, and communication change. While the common law has 
demonstrated some capacity to follow these shifts, it has lagged several 
decades behind, responding to the contours of some prior state of play. 
Politics - collective action - is precisely the means we can employ to 
overcome these difficulties although it, too, is susceptible to them. If, 
as the darker proponents of public choice theories tend to do, one saw 
only politics' susceptibilities, our prospects would look fairly bleak. If 
instead one believes that politics sometimes produces the results that 
the public would or should actually choose, then the challenges are 
threefold: to find some means of distinguishing the good from the bad, 
to find governmental structures that will tend to express those prefer-
ences rather than the products of self-interest, and to design imple-
menting regulations likely to be successful in securing those 
preferences once identified. Sunstein sees those challenges as worthy 
and capable of being met. 
The first of these problems is a compound of the failures of market 
ordering and a problem of moral philosophy. One means for identify-
ing ah actual collective preference, that Sunstein repeatedly employs, 
is to see how market ordering might be expected to fail, and then de-
termine whether the legislative response can be understood as a likely 
corrective to those failures. Much legislation can be so understood; 
examples include legislation that requires employers to provide safety 
information, or constrains abuse of public goods (air, water, etc.), or 
seeks to avoid discriminatory behaviors built on prior regimes now 
understood to have been unjust (for example, segregation), or estab-
lishes conventions regarding common social behavior, such as driving. 
This is a highly useful test, but one suspects not an infallible one. 
Among the examples Sunstein frequently invokes of laws that respond 
to failures of market ordering are the laws favoring "high culture" 
coverage in broadcast media. Although he presents an appealing pic-
ture of individuals who themselves watch "Wheel of Fortune" yet un-
derstand the need for the public to have "Live from Lincoln Center" 
available to all, it would not be difficult to tell this story as one in 
which rich, high-taste people appropriate public funds to satisfy their 
personal preferences.23 
That Sunstein does not credit the selfish explanation is a reflection 
23. T. 0DENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSITY AND SELF INTEREST 
AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE (1990). 
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of the way in which the problem of moral philosophy enters in. The 
"goodness" of some results, such as diversity in programming that will 
expose audiences to higher culture, invites the thought that at some 
level it is popularly wished, or at least invites indifferences to whether 
it is or not. It ought to be, because it is good. As it happens, I share 
that judgment about the good (as I suppose many academics do), and 
many others on which Sunstein's analyses to some extent rest - for 
example, that a law favoring the weaker elements of society is more 
likely to be just than one empowering the already mighty, or that it is 
good to promote autonomy in the process of preference formation, or 
that overcoming the effects of prior injustice is a necessary end of law. 
Nonetheless, these propositions rest outside the issues about the effects 
of market ordering, and rigorous justification of them would itself be a 
major intellectual undertaking. That is not the undertaking of this 
book; Sunstein does not develop a theory for identifying the good, but 
presents the moral views he holds essentially as premises generally 
shared in our society. Readers who do not share them are unlikely to 
find the argument persuasive on that score. 
A more general way of describing this problem is to note that at 
times Sunstein seems quite ambivalent about the place of collective 
choice as a justification for governmental action. This is so without 
regard to those contexts (speech suppression, racial discrimination) in 
which we might be said collectively to have agreed in our Constitution 
that some apparently collective choices about outcomes could not be 
legitimated. Consider, for example, the regulation of risk: shall we 
prohibit FDA approval of food additives that have any carcinogenic 
effect, however slight? Is it regulatory failure to require operating nu-
clear power plants to meet risk assessments that (to the extent such 
figures can be calculated) are thousands of times more demanding 
than those demanded of electricity sources employing coal or oil fuels? 
Both choices could be thought to proceed from a sort of innate human 
inaccuracy in risk assessment; we tend to be very sensitive about food 
supply relative to other risks, and we respond much more emphati-
cally to large-scale disaster or its potential than to the prospect of in-
cremental harms (coal) or geopolitical threats (oil). Although these 
tendencies might be manipulated in political campaigns, I find little 
reason to think that either the food additive policy or the current level 
of risk regulation required of nuclear power plants are other than the 
product of genuinely collective choice - and they appear likely to 
endure despite the public's awareness of its "error" and the resulting 
costs. This leads us to the uncomfortable position that Sunstein and I 
know what the good is and the public does not - or, perhaps, will not 
- and if the result of that is regulatory failure that has to be cor-
rected, then we have departed from democracy. And we have done so 
not because democratic process has been perverted by faction, or 
threatens to destroy a structural protection of the citizenry on which 
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we have collectively agreed, but because the public cannot be trusted, 
because some of us know the good better than others of us. 
Republicanism is a partial accommodation to this idea; Madison 
thought the election of representatives not only would avoid the 
problems of mass judgment and tend to control faction, but also would 
tend to place governmental decisions in the hands of the well-edu-
cated, who could be relied upon to subdue at least the larger excesses 
of momentary public zeal. Even that accommodation has its risks, 
and those risks are heightened if we undertake to act in cases in which 
some might think even the accommodation has failed to protect us 
against public excesses. Ordinarily Sunstein recognizes these 
problems. In particular, he presents himself as a republican, not an 
autocrat, and claims that he need not resolve the question of "the 
good" because his book addresses the functions of judges and adminis-
trators and (as I would agree) it is not appropriate for them to try to 
resolve this question (p. 73). They should respect collective political 
judgments, subject, perhaps, to some concern for distortions of the 
political process. One sometimes regrets that Sunstein does not always 
hold himself to the same constraint. 
A similar problem emerges regarding the taxonomy of regulatory 
functions that Sunstein builds as part of his justification for regulation. 
Although Sunstein's taxonomy has acknowledged and inevitable par-
allels to Judge Stephen Bteyer's taxonomy of regulatory failures,24 
Sunstein's emphasis on the achievement of ends outside the strictly 
economic - promoting diversity of tastes, advising redress of prior 
injustice - gives it a persuasive richness. He identifies eight general 
ends for which regulation may be undertaken, all but one frequently if 
not invariably justifiable in terms of the ends to be sought: response to 
market failure (pp. 48-55),25 public-interested redistribution of re-
sources (pp. 55-57), achievement of collective desires and aspirations 
(pp. 57-60),26 promotion of diverse experiences and preferences (pp. 
60-61), reduction of social subordination (often associated with prior 
unjust legal regimes) (pp. 61-64), the reduction of undesirable prefer-
ences (the wish for addictive drugs, for example) (pp. 64-67), the pre-
vention of outcomes that may prove irreversible and harmful to future 
24. S. BREYER, supra note 5. 
25. Here Sunstein invokes and persuasively explains the familiar problems of monopoly, col-
lective action, coordination (on which side of the road shall we drive?), inadequate information, 
and externalities. 
26. It is under this heading that Sunstein explains that "people seem to favor regulation 
designed to secure high-quality broadcasting even though their consumption patterns favor situa-
tion comedies." P. 58; see text accompanying supra note 23. While the particular example may 
be questionable, a general characterization that associates this with collective action problems is 
more persuasive: it is not hard to imagine preferences people actually have, but would not wish 
to satisfy "unless they are sure that others will be bound as well." P. 58. Energy conservation 
programs or recycling programs, which involve community commitments to sacrifices that might 
seem pointless on an individual basis, are examples. 
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generations (pp. 67-69), and (the bad apple) achievement of interest 
group transfers (pp. 69-71). Sunstein's examples are richer under 
some headings than under others; the explanations how market order-
ing cannot be expected to achieve these ends are clear and generally 
persuasive in supporting his judgment that (save for the last category) 
regulation seeking these ends not only can be explained, but also can 
often be justified under an attractive theory of desirable government 
function. 
How is one to distinguish a public-interested redistribution of re-
sources from an interest group transfer? How can one tell appropriate 
collective desires and aspirations from those that will interfere with 
either the desirable promotion of diverse experiences and preferences, 
or the reduction of social subordination the public or its representa-
tives previously unjustly chose? How do we know if the prevention of 
outcomes that may prove irreversible and harmful to future genera-
tions - implementation, say, of the Endangered Species Act - or the 
reduction of "undesirable" preferences serves public ends or merely 
permits a faction to impose its will on the public? Sunstein flags the 
questions as difficult, and uses examples that, on the whole, are appeal-
ing to our desire to further the ends he identifies. "Theory and facts 
must be assembled to explain why (for example) regulation of broad-
casting, public support for the arts, environmental controls and an-
tidiscrimination statutes are public-regarding whereas various banking 
controls and agricultural subsidies are simple responses to the power 
of self-interested private groups - if indeed these are the appropriate 
conclusions" (p. 70). 
One way to answer these questions is to look at outcomes: are the 
winners those that an interest group transfer theory would lead one to 
expect, or not? Indeed, that is the implicit mechanism of much of 
Sunstein's persuasion: laws favoring economically or socially 
subordinated groups, future generations, and, less clearly, green spaces 
are not the outcomes to be expected from interest-group transfers; that 
theory must strain to explain them against simpler and more persua-
sive accounts of civic virtue. He briefly suggests a few other means for 
distinction, but in the end escapes rigorous inquiry by invoking the 
limitation of his interests to questions of interpretation and the limita-
tion of judicial and agency interests to positions that accept the public-
spirited character of legislation. Invoking Lochner, he argues, "[t]he 
task of interpretation calls for sympathetic engagement with the mod-
em regulatory state, not for the use of principles conspicuously re-
jected by the rise of regulation" (p. 73). He has demonstrated that 
regulations can be, and often are, adopted for public ends; he finds that 
sufficient to command that courts and agencies, on the whole, presume 
that they are. 
An ensuing chapter, "How Regulation Fails," seeks to develop this 
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taxonomy by reference to experience, to understand whether we have 
achieved what we "wanted," and, if so, whether we achieved it at a 
price we ought to have been willing to pay. It is an essentially anecdo-
tal and inconclusive analysis - one that, on the whole, candidly ac-
knowledges the difficulty of any such inquiry and the limitations of 
this one. Sunstein begins with a list of important changes that have 
occurred in the wake of regulatory statutes: health gains from pollu-
tion reduction, restoration of fish and bird habitat, lives saved by 
seatbelts, reduced driving speeds and other auto safety changes, social 
changes resulting from legal measures against discrimination, and so 
forth. He continues with an impressive list of associated costs (not all 
for the same changes), many of which are outstandingly high: we may 
have spent $632 billion to produce pollution reductions that could 
have been achieved for one fifth that figure; some of the most impor-
tant pollution problems remain unresolved; responsible agencies seem 
incapable of acting on more than a few problems, which may not be 
the most important of those from which they could ·choose; and some-
times (as in the discrimination context recently) enforcement is simply 
lacking. All Sunstein intends to show by this, and he does claim to 
have shown it, is that "even when it is possible to identify a good rea-
son for statutory intervention, governmental regulation may not be 
successful" (p. 83). 
In assessing success or failure, however, Sunstein does not ac-
knowledge the problems created for such assessments by the tension 
between what seems best described as the product of collective choice 
and what Sunstein regards as the "good." Perhaps the problem of 
enforcement effort presents the clearest example. Much as I would 
like to believe the contrary, it seems most reasonable to view the elec-
tions of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan (twice), and George Bush as 
the repeated expression of an actual public preference to put in the 
White House a President committed to less regulation. Regulatory 
failure that results from political choice hardly suggests that regula-
tion must or ordinarily would fail to counter the results of market 
ordering, or even that it could do so only at a cost inordinately higher 
than any foreseeable benefit; it suggests that we are choosing not to 
regulate. The real failures, from the perspective of Sunstein's an-
nounced struggle against the forces of minimal government, are only 
those that are necessary - those that result from interest-group trans-
fers masquerading as regulation, from inevitable and permanent im-
balance of cost and benefit, 27 or the like. "Failures" that result from 
27. It bears noting that a number of the problems Sunstein raises are likely transitory. He 
notes, correctly, that regulation has often been put in place for new sources only, without regard 
for the possible tendency to keep old, bad sources in use for periods beyond what might other-
wise have been anticipated, and in that way to slow the course of progress. P. 92. Nonetheless, 
"grandfathering" is a traditional means of selling new ideas in politics and may well be preferable 
to other means of accommodating the interests of those most affected by new measures and 
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the workings of an acceptable political process should be excluded 
from the count. 
IV. 
In choosing to focus on the success of agency regulation rather 
than on issues of agency structure and in eliding the issues of collective 
action and the good, Sunstein ultimately obscures what in my judg-
ment are the two principal problems we face in constructive attention 
to government today. The first is the problem of governmental size; 
the second is our need for a means of theorizing about human behav-
ior in politics that can embrace humanity's innate collective drives at 
the same time as it theorizes about its individualistic ones, and without 
reducing the one to the other. 
Madison also saw (and for a time brilliantly accommodated) the 
importance of the problem of size in constructing effective govern-
ment. Finding governmental structures that will tend to express "pub-
lic" preferences (that is, either the actual preferences of the public, or 
the good), rather than the products of narrow self-interest, is the prob-
lem of republicanism, as Madison defined it. Sunstein has for some 
time shown himself to be among those who believe Madison had this 
problem right - designing government to defeat or at least diminish 
and contain the power of faction.28 Madison, however, was designing 
the institutions at the very head of government power, in a govern-
ment that was neither very large nor very powerful. In the same way 
that the shift from face-to-face transactions over widely comprehendi-
ble goods to anonymous chains-of-transaction in goods of extraordi-
nary complexity has transformed the law of sales and product liability, 
the shift from a face-to-face national government to one of mammoth 
bureaucracies in every quarter must transform the way we imagine 
government. A government of millions, acting under the oversight of 
presidential, congressional, and judicial offices that are themselves 
large bureaucracies, presents quite different problems for the civic en-
gineer than a government whose leadership population approximates 
the town meeting. Sunstein is aware of the difficulties, agrees that they 
must be addressed, and expresses some hope for constructive resolu-
tion. Yet the book chiefly addresses the relationship between the judi-
ciary and the agencies of government, while faction predominantly 
perhaps well placed to block them; over time, if at less than ideal speed, change occurs that 
market ordering would not have secured. 
One might also see the very high initial cost of pollution controls as a possibly transitional 
phenomenon. Commitment in that direction may spur innovation, alter social attitudes, and so 
forth, promising lower costs for the future; and some of the benefits of controls today may be 
measured in property damage, illnesses, and deaths that do not occur in the future. To the extent 
these results ensure today's costs can be regarded as a sort of capital investment, not properly 
assessed against current income only. 
28. E.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1542-64. 
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makes itself felt in the agencies via their relations with their other two, 
more political overseers, or via internal means those relations tend to 
promote. 
The issue about human nature is this: We know that economic 
analysis is premised on models that employ a simplified and impover-
ished account of human rational self-interest, as atomistic individuals 
who invariably seek personal gain. Emotion becomes not an expres-
sion of, but a distortion of, human character. Altruism, self-sacrifice, 
and collective behavior are to be explained as the products of strange 
tastes or other odd calculations about personal gain - that is, actions 
within the system of that model, and not the products of a competing, 
coexisting aspect of humanity. One may witness in history many phe-
nomena that can be explained much more simply as the expression of 
collective aspects of our being than as odd calculations of strictly per-
sonal gain. If we characteristically express our individuality in the 
market, as we surely do, we characteristically express the collective 
elsewhere - in the tribe, the church, the community. The impover-
ishment of the economic model lies precisely in its failure to account in 
a convincing way for that aspect of our character that is the most 
central to politics. Political organization is the means by which we 
express our collectivity.29 
Since people engaging in politics are fully human, they sometimes 
do act as the economic model would suggest; they are capable, and 
often drawn, to act in ways that seek personal gain rather than collec-
tive good. Yet economic analyses of politics that highlight the oppor-
tunities for self-dealing, or the possibilities of thus explaining 
ostensibly collective action, err in failing to credit the possibility of 
alternative explanations. Here one confronts a series of paradoxes or 
difficulties rooted in the juncture between our incapacity to escape the 
context in which we act and our ability to influence the context in 
which we will be. Understanding that political action may be self-
interested or collective in character, or perhaps a mix of the two -
that, in Madison's terms, men are not angels - we may appropriately 
take some defensive measures against the possibility that the ostensibly 
collective will in fact prove self-serving for some smaller, yet powerful 
group. Yet the more we admit that ostensibly collective action may be 
self-regarding, the more we invite self-regardingness as an acknowl-
edged, in some sense legitimate, aspect of political behavior. At the 
limit, if we simply contend that all political behavior is inevitably self-
regarding, we create enormous difficulties for ourselves, of the classic 
prisoners' dilemma sort. In a world that universally views political 
29. Cf. Shaviro, Beyond Public Opinion and Public Interests: A Study of the Legislative Pro-
cess as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990); Pildes & Ander-
son, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic 
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). 
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action as self-regarding, even if you and I understand that that is not 
the whole story, insuperable obstacles arise to achieving any outcome 
that is not a mutually advantageous "deal" for the winners in the eco-
nomic sense. But we cannot escape some self-regardingness (along 
with some communitarian expression), because we cannot escape be-
ing who we are; utopian communities equally deny the fullness of 
human nature and fall apart. 3° Finding and defending the middle 
ground here, too, seems to me to be a way of describing the battle that 
Sunstein is :fighting. 
It would be easier, of course, writing about this possessed with the 
knowledge we have all been denied, if I had in hand the theoretical 
structure that would account for both parts of our being. Bruce Ack-
erman has made a start with the distinction he proposes between "nor-
mal" and "constitutional" politics;31 whether or not one agrees with 
the particulars by which he identifies their competing realms, his rec-
ognition that we are capable of both selfish and other-regarding behav-
ior, and consequent proposition that some political events are as 
collective judgments outside the ordinary domain of political action, 
mark an important intellectual step. Sunstein attempts no similar 
framework. 
Just as the marketplace for goods has changed in ways that have 
compelled reorientation of law - public and private - the arena of 
politics has been changing in ways that doubtless contribute to the 
spirit of reexamination and skepticism that seems to characterize the 
current day. The political world has become considerably more bu-
reaucratic and impersonal than it was a century or two ago. The indi-
vidual now faces not only giant, distant corporations in the national 
economy, but also giant, distant government - with millions of civil 
servants organized in an unspeakably complex structure, more than 
20,000 in the bureaucracy of Congress, nearly as many attached to the 
presidency itself, and a similarly overstuffed judiciary. Maintaining 
the citizen's position in the changing political context is the analog to 
the problem of maintaining the consumer's position in the changing 
economic market. Not the subject ofSunstein's book, although he cer-
tainly recognizes the problem, it could be thought the largest problem 
public law faces in digesting our recent changes. 
The problem of legislative history may serve as an illustrative ex-
ample, both of the difficulties introduced by the mixed character of our 
political behavior and of the problems introduced by the size and com-
plexity of contemporary government. What use may appropriately be 
made of legislative history is, naturally enough, one of the issues Sun-
stein confronts in the statutory interpretation part of his work. His 
treatment is brief, ahistorical and hence acontextual, presented as an 
30. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946). 
31. E.g., Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989). 
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aspect of how we might best search for the appropriate meaning of a 
statute as enacted, and generally skeptical about using legislative his-
tory because of possibilities it will be manipulated by pressure groups 
not able to prevail on language, to serve self-interested ends. The 
paragraphs following present the problem longitudinally, in ways that 
may illustrate some of the themes I have been trying to develop here. 32 
We might begin around the tum of the century, when laissez faire 
ideas and the common law were dominant but the economy and the 
character of various markets had already begun to change in impor-
tant ways. Dominant judicial ideas at the time were that statutes were 
intrusions on the common law, that ought to be resisted - narrowly 
construed, or found offensive to Due Process if they interfered unjusti-
fiably with market ordering. Courts paid no more attention to the his-
tory of a statute than to the history of a contract. Legislatures 
responded more rapidly than the courts to the changes in the charac-
ter of markets - to the failures of market ordering to achieve widely 
shared visions of political justice. Given judicial attitudes of that time, 
legislators had no reason to expect their reports and debates to be of 
much significance other than influencing other legislators. Judges, 
dealing only and narrowly with words, produced results that appeared 
to misunderstand statutory purpose and ignore political realities. This 
generated sharp responses. Most fundamental were the strong and ul-
timately prevailing criticism of the judicial performance as an-
tidemocratic and, as important, the first stages in the establishment of 
the regulatory state - the creation of governmental bodies other than 
courts that could do court-like work and could be relied upon to carry 
out the ends that the people, through their legislatures, had politically 
chosen. 
The period conventionally bounded by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. American Trucking Association Inc., 33 brought 
a series of changes. Judges, responding to criticism about their ob-
struction of popular will in the construction of statutes, became more 
and more comfortable immersing themselves in the political history of 
statutes. These developments are sometimes presented as a search for 
specific meaning, but initially appear to have been directly responsive 
to the critique of earlier practice - a means of self-education regard-
ing political purpose, to reduce the chance of misunderstanding the 
drives that produced the legislative outcomes. Leading commentators 
stressed the importance of using statutes as a generative source of law-
policy within the common law, of building on rather than resisting 
legislative judgments in fashioning the general body of law. American 
32. Some of the ideas in the paragraphs following are also developed in Strauss, Relational 
Readers of Intransitive Statutes: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 
CHI.-KENT L. R.Ev. (forthcoming 1990). 
33. 310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
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Trucking capped these developments not long after "substantive due 
process" had been repudiated as well. The two developments gener-
ally are not tied, but both represent the same impulse: judicial recog-
nition of political judgment as a superior source of law, of the senior 
status of the legislature. 
The repudiation of judicial policymaking following the substantive 
due process decisions seems also to have produced a change of empha-
sis respecting statutory interpretation. Justice Stone, a pro-statute 
progressive in the 1920s and 1930s, would write about the judicial 
function of creating a unified body of law out of common law and 
statute, recognizing the superior claim of the legislature;34 his view 
embodied a relatively strong judicial role, and one that would suggest 
more interest in general political purpose than in particularities of 
meaning. The Justices who joined the Court in the New Deal period, 
on the whole, accepted a more junior, atomistic role for themselves. 
They saw it as their responsibility to discern the particulars of congres-
sional judgment: that led to quite detailed appraisals of legislative his-
tory. Judges did not seek just to understand political impulse, from 
which it might be possible to build a responsive legal order; they 
looked for the specific directions on the particular issue that might be 
implicit in the statute. 
Yet as judges focused with greater energy on questions of detail, 
the legislature was changing in ways that added to the perils of such 
specific inquiries. The development perhaps the most prominent in 
the recent arguments about return to text-based interpretation was leg-
islators' and others' growing awareness that legislative materials were 
being used for interpretive purposes after enactment, as well as (and 
perhaps more than) for persuasive and explanatory purposes during 
the enactment process. Increasingly, judges' awareness that reports 
may be written or remarks made in the hopes of influencing them has 
produced understandable hesitation to rely on these materials. Relat-
edly, the growth of the congressional bureaucracy has changed the 
character of Congress' working process in ways that bring these 
materials into question. Legislators spend less time legislating, less 
time in face-to-face dealings with one another, and have become more 
reliant on their expanding staffs; this further undercuts any notion that 
the conventional materials are the persuasive and explanatory docu-
ments they appear to be. 
Finally, and particularly in the regulatory context, the character of 
the legislative enterprise has changed. Congress less frequently issues 
instructions directly to citizens, and more frequently orders govern-
ment agents, in greater or lesser detail, to administer a given set of 
policies. 35 This inserts a third reference point into the statutory equa-
34. See Stone, supra note 8. 
35. See Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 
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tion; it is no longer a matter only of discerning the meaning that might 
have been chosen by Congress (that less frequently decides) or under-
stood by the citizen (who is less frequently addressed). An official 
reader with special responsibilities and a continuing set of political as 
well as legal relationships with the Congress and the President inter-
prets the text on a continuing basis. 
These developments certainly mandate further change in judicial 
response, but it ought not to be simply a return to textualism. The 
judge's need for information about the political impetus for the mea-
sure before her, information which statutory words alone are unlikely 
to supply, remains unaltered. Congress' steadily increasing use of 
agencies rather than courts to administer statutes itself suggests the 
need for sympathetic implementation. A judicial approach that sig-
nals lack of interest in even the broadest dimensions of the political 
history and direction of legislation will only aggravate that usage - as 
well as underscore, in a democracy, the problematic character of such 
an approach. That, one would have thought, was the judicial lesson of 
the New Deal. 
Moreover, the introduction of the third reader, the agency, and its 
character as a continuing and political player in statutory administra-
tion, suggest ways in which the legislative history process may be 
reconceived, even if we concede that it no longer represents much of a 
deposit of persuasion and explanation within the Congress. 36 The very 
fact of increased reliance on staff work and committee work within 
Congress suggests the possible fruitfulness of regarding the documents 
of legislative history as an agreed record of that process. The existence 
of the agency as a continuing administrator, in a continuing oversight 
relationship with the Congress, also implies that we may be wrong to 
think that the principal aim of making such records is to influence the 
courts. 
We are not about to undo the governmental changes we have ex-
perienced in the past century, given their origin in reaction both to the 
changing conditions of an industrial, national economy and to judicial 
resistance to democratic impulse. The third reader, then, is a fact that 
will not go away. Its presence and the nature of its relationships with 
the political branches change the context for statutory interpretation 
in a manner text-exclusive approaches cannot accommodate. Those 
approaches imagine statutes rather unlike the common law, at least as 
we now understand the common law; the statute-as-text is generally 
seen as a vessel of fixed meaning, with the disputes focused on the 
(1989); Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. 
L. REv. 427 (1989). 
36. Note, however, that because all players in the legislature know how material may be 
used, and are long-term participants in the legislative enterprise, what materials appear where in 
the legislature history is likely to reflect political strength and degree of political commitment, 
not just individual manipulation of the system. 
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reference points for determining that meaning - words that are read, 
or historical purposes or intents that were held. But statutes no longer 
have meaning so much as they invite others to supply it; those supply-
ing meaning are caught up in a complex of continuing political rela-
tionships that is expected to influence the meaning that is supplied. 
The judicial function has become one more of supervision of the work-
ings of this process - that is, administrative law - than of fixing 
concrete meanings.37 In this process, like the common law, meaning 
emerges over time, in response to the stimulus of events. 
Of course, we have not escaped from ourselves. Like the judges 
and the legislators before them, agency officials may express their "ra-
tional self-interest maximizer" side as well as their collectivist selves. 
Legislators and presidents acting to oversee their continuing adminis-
tration, employing the characteristic forms of political oversight, may 
act for faction or for nation. These possibilities cannot be escaped; in 
hoping they can be shaped or controlled, we have always to remember 
that they will also be lurking in the behavior of whatever next set of 
institutions or safeguards we design. 
What we notice about legislative history in this context are some 
characteristics that seem to argue for its continued use. To the extent 
it is a record at all, it is a record of what occurred at the time Congress 
took its constitutionally characteristic action of legislating. While it 
embodies some admixture of manipulative, potentially factional 
nonlegislation in it, what we now need to consider is that Congress is 
subject to manipulative, potentially factional influences at all times -
when it is overseeing as well as when it is legislating. Legislative his-
tory is associated with the legislating; devaluing it is, in some respects, 
devaluing legislating in relation to what else Congress does. Further, 
unlike much oversight activity, the legislative history is public and 
generally accessible, and engages Congress as a whole. When one be-
gins to see the problem of giving statutes meaning as a relational 
rather than as a discrete process, the availability of context-setting ref-
erence points against which to assess the course of that relationship is 
not to be denigrated. 
Perhaps most important, once the legislative moment bas passed, 
the legislative history provides a haven of "law" (as well as political 
instruction) for the administrative agency against the continuing poli-
tics of the oversight process. Often present during the legislative pro-
cess, the agency does not view the legislative history issue as providing 
an optional means of acquiring information about an incidental prob-
lem. The legislative history it worries about is its legislative history, 
perhaps more properly just its history: it would be an integral part of 
its daily experience whether courts concerned themselves with it or 
not. This history is inseparable from the statute the agency adminis-
37. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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ters, and the particular and continuing responsibility the agency has. 
It sets understandings with the agency's oversight committees, which 
are forces far more powerful in its daily life than the courts, and wou1d 
do so whether the courts paid attention to this history or not. It pro-
vides a framework of expectation likely to be enforced, a basis for 
common understanding with committee staffs whose working lives 
parallel those of the civil servants at the agency; and it sets constraints 
on those relationships by establishing a set of baselines against which 
the moment's effort at oversight may be measured. 
This is not the place to develop fully ideas about the uses of legisla-
tive history once we begin to see statutes in a relational light. For 
present purposes, I want only to suggest that this shift in paradigm 
represents an important sea-change in the regulatory state, and that 
we cannot think about such issues as statutory interpretation for the 
regu1atory state without taking this shift into account. We need to 
examine our arguments about interpretive techniques, to guard against 
the implicit assumption that statutes have fixed meanings, rather than 
meanings that develop over time under the administration of agencies 
and the supervision of courts. Today, as in Sunstein's book, questions 
of changing statutory meaning are presented as if the only issue were 
the rather dramatic question of "obsolescence" or "middle age." But 
that presentation continues to see statutes as rocks, lacking the plastic-
ity of the common law; it fails to find in them generative force for new 
common law,38 or a way of adapting the judiciary to what is our new 
mode of providing flexibility and change in law. 
v. 
Finally, although Sunstein's "rights revolution" is not troubling in 
one descriptive sense, in another it raises a set of issues with which I 
think he has not adequately dealt. Plainly, we recognize, and embody 
in expanded notions about standing to challenge agency action, 39 that 
regulatory legislation often creates expectations in its intended benefi-
38. See Pound, supra note 7. 
39. Sunstein is not as clear as he might be in recognizing that this generally expanded notion 
of standing is a judicial, rather than statutory, artifact. See pp. 210-17. The drafters of the 
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 gave no hint that they anticipated the Supreme Court's 
1970 holding that their language conferred general standing on statutory beneficiaries. Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In the context of that time 
one could believe only that the drafters meant to save the "private attorney general" idea that 
had been developed concerning some particular statutes authorizing review at the behest of per-
sons aggrieved. E.g., Associated Indus., N.V. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 
320 U.S. 707 (1943). This observation does not render the Court's 1970 holdings erroneous for 
one who accepts, as I do, that judicial interpretation is appropriately informed by the possibilities 
of language when interpretation occurs. The words can be understood as the Court understood 
them, and the argument for doing so is essentially Sunstein's. Nonetheless, seeing this as a judi-
cial artifact may itself serve to highlight some of the problems involved in describing the person 
aggrieved's claim as a "right" in the fullest sense. Cf Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 110 S. 
Ct. 3177 (1990). 
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ciaries that could be described as "rights." The problem is whether 
these descriptively are - or normatively ought to be regarded as -
fully the same "rights" as one usually means when talking about the 
right, for example, not to be compelled to incriminate oneself or to 
secure federal judicial relief under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 
for action taken under the color of state law that deprives one of 
"rights." Sunstein often treats regulatory expectations as equivalent to 
these individuated claims, yet we may be permitted to doubt, for ex-
ample, whether a section 1983 action could be brought for their viola-
tion. 40 Indeed, one sees in the tensions beneath the surface of recent 
decisions on standing and the application of section 1983 fairly strong 
intimations of a return to a "legal rights" theory of judicial review -
with, however, the rights now expanded to embrace the "new 
property. "41 
The distinction suggested here, one Sunstein does not discuss, is 
the distinction Holmes developed in a holding still central to the do-
main of procedural due process. Holmes contrasts official action by 
which claimants are "exceptionally affected, in each case upon individ-
ual grounds" (procedural due process requires some kind of a hearing) 
with action having a more general impact, for which citizens' "rights 
are protected in the only way they can be in a complex society, by 
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule" (no 
hearing is required).42 One need not agree with Holmes that only 
political controls are relevant in the latter context to understand the 
force behind the impulse to differentiate the individual case (where 
politics cannot be expected to help, where issues are likely to be bipo-
lar rather than polycentric, and so forth) from the general one. Citi-
zen "power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule" is 
present in the settings Sunstein wishes to capture by his "rights revolu-
tion"; politics is inevitably and appropriately involved. That suggests 
possible bases and needs for differentiation that warrant exploration. 
Sunstein suggests one possible response in discussing the distinc-
tion between agency action and agency inaction. This distinction 
played an important role in the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. 
40. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990), in which a bare majority of 
the Court permitted a § 1983 action to be brought by health care providers to challenge stat!! 
reimbursement practices under Medicaid. While some language in the opinion suggests a notion 
of "right" broader than the individualized claims for fair payment for services actually rendered 
that were at stake in that case, Justice White's switch to the conservative majority in Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Fedn., 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), two weeks following, and the emphasis in that 
opinion on the differences between political and judicial controls over administrative action sug· 
gests that that is not a likely direction for the Court. 
41. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 1991). 
42. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). Cj Lujan, 
110 S. Ct. at 3191. 
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Chaney 43 that agency decisions not to enforce are presumptively non-
reviewable. Such priority-setting decisions resemble Holmes' second, 
more political context in their polycentricity and their usual reference 
to the budgetary and executive processes. For "traditionally disadvan-
taged groups, public aspirations, and collective action problems," Sun-
stein notes, political controls are unlikely to be successful (p. 220). 
The argument echoes Justice Stone's famous justifications for strict 
judicial scrutiny of some constitutional issues, set out in footnote 4 of 
his opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Corp. 44 Stone, how-
ever, was not supporting rights for the powerless that the powerful 
would not share. He thought the judiciary should keep the political 
process responsive, and did not argue that the judiciary should weight 
that process toward the downtrodden; the judiciary was to uphold the 
individual liberties of all citizens (a role that, to be sure, might be espe-
cially important for the disadvantaged), not just the liberties of the 
insular minorities. 
Past experience with such administrative law developments as the 
paper hearing strongly suggests, as should not be surprising, that the 
powerful readily appropriate legal innovations undertaken in the name 
of the underrepresented.45 In the context of individual rights, we ac-
cept that cost (although affirmative action is proving a puzzle); for 
matters that are at root political, it is at least questionable whether we 
can afford to go past the point of enhancing the integrity of our explic-
itly political processes. Sunstein does not put his recommendations to 
the hard test of seeing how they might be used by the "other side." 
Moreover, it may be that judicial protections have proved available in 
the past precisely because courts have tended to act in contexts in 
which we do not openly concede a significant, legitimate role to poli-
tics. Where political controls are available to the citizen seeking to 
influence administrative actipn, the question of allocating power be-
tween the courts and the political branches requires attention not only 
to the relative competencies of each, but also to the enhanced risk that 
the courts' actions will themselves be politicized. The latter risk is 
particularly striking for an enterprise like Sunstein's proposed canons, 
with their implicit reliance on objectified and essentially apolitical ad-
ministration. Yet Sunstein's instincts are to extend judicial action sig-
nificantly into central political realms. 
Thus, consistent with his earlier writings on the subject, Sunstein 
argues for significant judicial oversight of congressional and agency 
judgments respecting agency prioritizing. In Young v. Community 
43. 470 U.S. 821 (1984). 
44. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
45. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Portland 
Cement Assn. v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, U.S. 921 (1974). 
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Nutrition Institute, 46 the Supreme Court accepted a Food and Drug 
Administration judgment that its governing statute did not require it 
to undertake rulemaking to define tolerances for every poisonous or 
deleterious substance that might unavoidably occur in food. This was 
an error in Sunstein's view, because statutory syntax ("the Secretary 
shall promulgate regulations") suggests an obligation to act - in-
dependent of any consideration of agency resources, independent of 
political controls that could be exercised over such decisions, and in-
dependent of the effect judicial oversight might have on agency re-
sources and decisionmaking (pp. 162-63). 
Similarly, Sunstein believes Heckler v. Chaney 47 (in which the 
Court announced a presumption against judicial review of agency in-
action) was in error because it depended so strongly on the common 
law baseline. Although here Sunstein acknowledges "plausible rea-
sons to treat agency inaction in a different way from agency action," 
he insists that the courts must be available to say whether "the agency 
has acted responsibly"; he does not give much weight to the alterna-
tive (political) fora in which that question may be asked, the resource 
costs to the agency of permitting that question to be (repeatedly) asked 
in court by its opponents (powerful as well as weak), or - especially, 
in my judgment - the possibilities of judicial politicization inherent in 
a question so programmatic in character, a question that would in-
volve the judiciary so closely in executive judgment (p. 220). The 
problem, then, is whether one can maintain the predominantly apoliti-
cal character of the courts that seems so central to the Madisonian 
vision Sunstein wants to revive, without paying closer attention to 
Holmes' division between the worlds of political and legal controls 
than Sunstein cares to essay. 
Note that this division is not the same as the distinction between 
regulatory subjects and regulatory beneficiaries. Holmes' distinction 
was developed in a case in which those relegated to political process 
were regulated entities, property owners who had been affected by tax 
reassessments applicable across the board; thus, the result put them in 
the same position as the beneficiaries of the municipal services to be 
underwritten by the additional tax revenues. It is an attraction of Sun-
stein's approach that tends to put regulated and regulatory benefi-
ciaries on an equal "procedural claim" footing; and it is certainly not 
my purpose to endorse the argument, which has recently resurfaced in 
the Supreme Court, 48 that the regulated have stronger claims to judi-
cial hearings than regulatory beneficiaries in any particular procedural 
context. The problem with Sunstein's approach is the way in which it 
tempts us to overlook the differences between particular procedural 
46. 476 U.S. 974 (1986). 
47. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
48. E.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fecln., 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
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contexts (the decision whether or not to commit resources to a project, 
as against the decision on a project to which resources have been com-
mitted) in assessing the appropriateness of procedural claims; for both 
the regulated and the regulatory beneficiary, judgments about priori-
ties and resource allocations are contexts that, as Holmes' argument 
suggests, must be left to political controls. 
VI. 
Wrestling with the place of statutes in law suggests the struggles 
over the relative place of the judiciary, legislature, and executive in 
government. The recent rounds of judicial formalism in reading stat-
utes respond to real changes in government and its institutions. At the 
same time, the response threatens to enlarge executive authority at the 
expense of both Congress and the courts. Turning away from legisla-
tive politics and a view of courts as integrators of the legal order per-
mits a centralization of effective authority for government that should 
seem particularly troublesome in a democracy characterized by enor-
mous government. If the size and ambition of our government are not 
mistakes - and Sunstein makes tha,t case well - then we need to 
address its work in ways that both enhance its opportunities for suc-
cess, and promise restraints on its power. After the Rights Revolution 
is an important effort in that direction. 
